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This paper assesses whether there is a gender gap in the 
use of financial services by businesses and individuals in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors do not find evidence 
of gender discrimination or lower inherent demand for 
financial services by enterprises with female ownership 
participation or by female individuals when key 
characteristics of the enterprises or individuals are taken 
into account. In the case of enterprises, they explain this 
finding with selection bias—females are less likely to run 
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sole proprietorships than men, and firms with female 
ownership participation are smaller, but more likely to 
innovate. In the case of individuals, the lower use of 
formal financial services by women can be explained 
by gender gaps in other dimensions related to the use 
of financial services, such as their lower level of income 
and education, and by their household and employment 
status. 
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1.  Introduction 
Access to and use of financial services by both enterprises and households is of 
increasing concern to policy makers across Africa and the developing world. Recent data 
collection efforts on both the enterprise and household levels have enabled a more rigorous 
analysis (World Bank, 2007). One important dimension in the access to finance debate, which 
has been less analyzed, is the gender gap. Specifically, it has often been argued that lack of 
access to finance impedes female entrepreneurship and prevents women from participating in 
the modern market economy. Given the overall lack of financial service provision, with fewer 
than one in five households having access to formal financial services, this problem is 
potentially more pressing in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other developing regions of the 
world (Honohan and Beck, 2007).  
As documented by an extensive and still growing literature, access to credit is 
important for firm growth, especially that of small firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2005), and for new business creation (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2006).  
Country-specific studies and randomized field experiments confirm that access to capital can 
be critical for firm growth (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008; De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 
2008).  However credit is not the only financial service that seems to matter.  Recent 
evidence shows that access to savings services can also increase enterprise investment, 
especially among female entrepreneurs (Dupas and Robinson, 2009).  Broad access to 
financial services is not only important for individuals, but also for the economy at large; 
credit constraints reduce the efficiency of capital allocation and intensify income inequality 
by impeding the flow of capital to poor individuals with investment opportunities with high 
expected returns (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Galor and Moav, 2004, 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2007; Lopez and Serven, 2009).  Gender differences in     2     
 
access to financial services can therefore have direct negative repercussions not only for 
female entrepreneurs and individuals but for the overall economy.  
This paper analyzes gender differences in access to credit by enterprises and use of 
formal and informal financial services by individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, we 
use enterprise surveys to assess whether female entrepreneurs in Sub-Saharan Africa are less 
likely to rely on formal bank finance, compared to male entrepreneurs and compared to 
female entrepreneurs outside Sub-Saharan Africa. We also use recent FinScope and 
FinAccess surveys across nine countries in Southern and East Africa to assess gender 
differences in the use of formal and informal financial services by individuals. 
This paper relates to a growing literature on the gender gap in access to credit (see 
Klapper and Parker, 2010, for a survey). Cross-country studies have shown that women are 
less likely to get financing from a formal financial institution or are charged higher interest 
rate than men (Muravyev, et al., 2007) and generally raise less formal and informal venture 
capital than men (Brush, et al., 2004). Bruhn (2009), on the other hand, does not find any 
evidence for Latin America of a gender gap in access to credit by enterprises.  Richardson, 
Howarth and Finnegan (2004) find for Sub-Saharan Africa that women entrepreneurs are 
more likely than male entrepreneurs to rely on internal or informal financing. This gender gap 
is also reflected in higher financing obstacles reported by women.  The literature has also 
explored the reasons behind such a gender gap. Buvinic and Berger (1990) find that female 
entrepreneurs struggle more with loan applications, while Lusardi and Tufano (2009) find 
lower overall financial literacy among women.  However, behavioral differences might also 
be important, leading to taste rather than statistical discrimination (Beck, Behr and 
Madestam, 2011).  Evidence from Africa shows that in many instances, only male heads of 
households are able to successfully receive formal credit (Johnson, 2004).     3     
 
Among institutional factors explaining gender differences in access to credit might be 
property right restrictions for women. Such restrictions might include requirements for 
married women to obtain their husband‟s signature and approval for all banking transactions.
1 
Women can also be affected by a husband‟s adverse credit history, which might require his 
wife to repay the debt or be denied credit (Naidoo and Hilton, 2006).  
The observation of a gender gap has led many NGO supported microcredit institutions 
to focus on women rather than men. Given the limitations of microcredit, both in volume and 
in outreach, however, it is important to understand differences in the use of formal banking 
services (Honohan, 2004).  In addition to formal financial services, many individuals and 
enterprises across the developing world use informal financial services, ranging from money 
lenders to ROSCAS. In our empirical work, we will therefore also consider the use of 
informal financial services by households.  
The empirical findings of the enterprise analyses show that firms with female 
ownership participation do not seem to have worse access to credit than firms with purely 
male ownership, neither within Sub-Saharan Africa nor across the world. However, we do 
find that African enterprises are more financially constrained and that larger firms have more 
access to financial services. We argue that the apparently surprising results of lack of gender 
difference in access to finance can be actually explained by the existence of a selection 
process. First, female entrepreneurs are less likely to own sole proprietorships than men and 
face higher regulatory burden than men, especially in Africa. Second, enterprises with female 
ownership are smaller and therefore have less access to the financial markets, and women are 
less likely to be entrepreneurs. Third, female owned enterprises are more likely to innovate 
what could be explained by the fact that female entrepreneurs need to be especially capable in 
order to be able to enter the formal sector and in fact have characteristics that make them 
                                                 
1 See Women, Business and the Law; “Improving the Legal Investment Climate for Women in Africa” (Hallward-
Driemeier, 2011`) for more detailed information and broader coverage of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.     4     
 
more attractive for financial institutions. Finally, we find some limited support for the 
hypothesis of a “sectoral selection” as female ownership tend to be more prevalent in sectors 
that, on average across countries, tend to rely less on access to external finance. This is 
consistent with Gajigo and Hallward-Driemeier (2010) who find suggestive evidence, in four 
African countries, that there is a gender gap in capital at the start up. Although start-up capital 
gender difference is higher along sector than by gender, the median capital for male 
entrepreneurs is more than twice that of the female entrepreneurs. These selection biases 
might explain that once we focus on a sample of existing enterprises and control for firm size, 
sector and other firm characteristics we do not find any significant effect of female ownership 
participation.  
The household analysis shows that while unconditional comparisons present a lower 
use of formal banking services by women, there is no significant gender difference once we 
control for other individual characteristics, including education, income, work status, 
geographic location, and education.  While gender differences in the use of informal financial 
services vary across countries, women are not more or less likely to be excluded from any 
financial service than men, at least in our sample of nine countries.  Lower income and 
education, a lower likelihood to be formally employed and their role within the household 
explain why, prima facie, women are less likely to use formal financial services. These 
barriers that women face as individuals to access formal financial services might also explain 
the selection bias among female entrepreneurs mentioned above, though we cannot formally 
test for it. On the other hand, we find that women in several countries are more likely to use 
informal financial services. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on access to finance along several dimensions. 
First, while most studies so far have been limited to one country, this is a cross-country 
exploration of gender differences in access to and use of financial services, both across     5     
 
enterprises and households.
2 Second, this paper considers access to and use of all financial 
services, not just credit as done in large parts of the literature. In addition, it also looks 
beyond formal financial services to informal financial services. Third, this paper contributes 
to the literature on gender differences in Sub-Saharan Africa. As rigorous analysis for Sub-
Saharan African is often impeded by the lack of appropriate data, the data compilations used 
in this paper offer a unique opportunity to explore gender differences in the participation in 
formal and informal economies in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section focuses on the 
gender gap in enterprise finance using a large cross-section of firm-level surveys. Section 3 
presents results on the gender gap in the use of financial services by individuals and section 4 
concludes.  
 
2.  Gender and Enterprise Access to Credit 
This section assesses whether there is a gender gap in enterprises‟ access to and use of 
bank finance. Specifically, using firm-level survey data, we will assess whether businesses 
with female ownership participation (i) are less likely to use a formal financing channel (e.g. 
overdraft or loan), (ii) have a lower share of investment financed by financial institutions, and 
(iii) have a lower share of working capital financed by financial institutions. The section first 
describes the data and then turns to multivariate regressions.  
 
2.1.   Data  
To explore the relationship between gender and enterprise access to credit, we use the 
World Bank-IFC Enterprise Surveys. The Enterprise Surveys have been conducted over the 
                                                 
2 See World Bank (2007) for an overview of studies on access to finance.     6     
 
past eight years in over 100 countries with a consistent survey instrument.
3 The surveys try to 
capture business perceptions on the most important obstacles to enterprise operation and 
growth, but also include detailed information on management and financing arrangements of 
companies.    Sample sizes vary between 250 and 1,500 companies per country and data are 
collected using either simple random or random stratified sampling.  The sample includes 
formal and informal enterprises of all sizes, different ownership types and across nine sectors 
in manufacturing, construction, services and transportation.  Firms from different locations, 
such as capital city, major cities and small towns, are included. Our empirical work relies on 
data for formal enterprises from 37 African countries and 49 countries from the rest of the 
world covering in total 35,000 firms during 2006 to 2009 (Appendix Table A1).
4  In addition, 
we focus on informal mostly micro-firms for a sample of 25 African countries. 
The Enterprise Surveys offer several advantages for our purpose. First, the surveys 
collect comparable information for several firm characteristics across all the countries. This 
comparability allows us to document cross-country and within-country profiles of firms that 
have female ownership participation. Second, the surveys collect information on financing at 
the firm level as well as several other relevant firm characteristics. These include the firm 
size and age, human capital composition of the workforce, measures of technology adoption 
and firms‟ international openness, i.e. export activity and sources of capital. In addition, there 
is also detailed information on the firm‟s geographical location and its sector of activity (3-
digit-ISIC classification). Third, the surveys reach a substantial number of countries across all 
                                                 
3 See www.enterpriseseurveys.org for more details. Similar surveys were previously conducted under the 
leadership of the World Bank and other IFIs in Africa (RPED), and world-wide in 2000 (World Business 
Environment Survey).  Enterprise Surveys still go under different names in some regions, e.g. BEEPS in the 
Central Asia and Eastern European transition economies had first been launched in 1999 and was then modified 
to be comparable with the broader global initiative. 
4 We lose 25 countries when using the share of working capital financed with external finance, mostly in Eastern 
and Central Europe and East Asia.  There are a total of 95 surveys but some countries enter the dataset in 
multiple years. Information collected is standardized across countries and covers formal establishments with 5 
or more employees. However, Africa, East Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America include establishments 
with fewer than 5 employees. In Africa, there are an additional 25 standardized surveys covering micro-firms 
and targeting informal establishments.      7     
 
the regions of the world. 30.4 percent of our formal sample is in Africa, 33.5 percent in 
Eastern and Central Europe, 32.4 percent in Latin America, and 3.7 percent in Asia. Thirty-
six percent of sample firms have female ownership participation; 28 percent in Africa and 39 
percent in the rest of the world.  
Table 1 Panel A provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
Thirty-six percent of firms in our sample have at least one female owner. Thirteen percent of 
formal firms across the sample have 5 or fewer employees, while in Africa, these represent 
21 percent of the firms. In the overall sample, 30 percent of enterprises are sole 
proprietorships, 13 percent of firms export at least 10 percent of their sales and 10 percent 
have foreign owners holding at least 10 percent of capital. In terms of location, 40 percent are 
located in the capital or cities with populations of 1 million or more. The average age of firms 
is 16 years. We also find that enterprises finance, on average, 18 percent of their fixed asset 
investment with bank finance and 9 percent of their working capital needs with bank finance, 
while, on average, 55 percent of firms have a bank loan or overdraft facility.  
Table 1 Panel B shows the sample distribution by gender and type of company. If we 
focus on formal companies we confirm that in Africa only 28 percent of companies have 
female ownership participation, while the percentage in the entire sample (including Africa) 
is 36 percent. The percentage of informal companies with female ownership participation in 
Africa is 33 percent.
5 Finally, when focusing on formal sole proprietorships (often micro and 
small ones) the difference in prevalence of female ownership participation between Africa 
and the entire sample is only three percentage points (24 percent in Africa versus 27.1 percent 
in the entire sample). In our multivariate analysis, we will present results for the whole 
sample as well as for a subsample of sole proprietorships, as this allows us to isolate 
enterprises that are completely run by a female owner, as opposed to other firms where some 
                                                 
5 We cannot compare this to the rest of the world because informal sector surveys where not performed in other 
regions outside Africa.      8     
 
but not necessarily all of the owners are female.  As Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2010) 
show, up to half of the firms that have multiple owners of which at least one is female, do not 
have women among their prime decisions makers.  So „female participation in ownership‟ 
defines a wider circle of firms as „female‟, and thus may lead to lower bound estimates on the 
extent to which gender may matter.  Looking at sole proprietors does address the ownership-
decision maker distinction, but the average size of the firm is smaller. 
 
2.2. Multivariate Regression Results  
We start from estimating the equation below where our outcome variable of interest is 
measured at the level of the firm i in country c belonging to sector s at time t.  
                                                                 
                                                                              
                                                      (1)           
where y is one of our three financing variables – (i) a dummy variable that takes value one if 
the firm has access to a formal financing channel (e.g. overdraft or loan), (ii) the share of 
fixed asset investment financed by financial institutions, and (iii) the share of working capital 
financed by financial institutions.  Fem is a dummy variable indicating female ownership 
participation, Afr is a dummy for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and Empl is the log of the 
number of employees, thus an indicator of enterprise size. In addition, we include industry 
and time fixed effects in order to control for industry characteristics and time- specific global 
shocks. We also include macroeconomic characteristics such as the inflation rate, GDP per 
capita and average growth of GDP in previous three years. In robustness tests, we add an 
additional array of firm characteristics; the age of the company, a dummy variable identifying 
location in a large city
6, a dummy variable identifying exporters and a dummy variable 
                                                 
6 Defined as capital cities or with population of one million or more.     9     
 
identifying foreign ownership. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level, thus 
allowing for unobserved variables driving correlation in financing across enterprises in a 
specific survey. All models are estimated with OLS due to the difficulty of interpreting the 
marginal effects of interaction terms in non-linear models (Ai and Norton, 2003). However, 
re-estimating the model using a Tobit or Probit model generates qualitatively similar results 
(these results are available upon request). 
This flexible specification in regression (1) allows us to analyze several questions: 
1.  The coefficient 1 indicates whether enterprises with female ownership 
participation are more financially constrained than other companies. 
2.  The coefficient 4 indicates whether the financing situation of businesses with 
female ownership participation in Sub-Saharan Africa is different from that of 
businesses with female ownership participation in other parts of the world. 
3.  The coefficients 5and 7 indicate whether these effects are different for firms 
of different sizes across the world (5) and specifically in Africa (7).    
Table 2 presents the results for the broad cross-country sample, while Tables 3 to 5 
present results for African countries only. Given the cross-sectional nature of our results, they 
should not be interpreted in a causal manner as they only present conditional correlations. 
The results, reported in Table 2, columns 1-4, show that, on average, there is no 
statistically significant difference in terms of access to finance between companies with and 
without female ownership participation, including in a subsample of sole proprietorships. 
This relationship does not vary between African and non-African countries, but it varies 
across firms of different size.  In fact, size does not only matter for firms with female 
ownership participation, but it matters in general, as larger enterprises are more likely to have 
access to external finance.  A ten percent increase in firm size translates into a 6 to 6.5 
percent higher probability of accessing formal finance across all firms and 9.6 percent higher     10     
 
probability for sole proprietorships.  The economic effect is even bigger for firms in Africa 
compared to firms elsewhere, with firms in Africa facing a 46 percent lower likelihood of 
accessing formal finance.  The size effect is larger for firms with female ownership 
participation and for firms in Africa as shown by positive interaction terms between the 
female dummy and employment and the Africa dummy and employment, respectively; 
however, the latter results does not hold for sole proprietorships. We do not find any 
differential effect of the size-Africa interaction across firms with and without female 
ownership participation. We also find that privately-owned firms with limited liability, older 
firms, companies located in larger cities, and exporting firms are more likely to access 
external finance, although many of these variables turn insignificant in the sub-sample of sole 
proprietorships.  
The results in columns 5-8 of Table 2 show that, while on average there is no 
statistically significant difference in the share of investment financed by financial institutions 
between businesses with and without female ownership participation, this is not the case in 
Africa. In fact, the interaction between Africa and female ownership participation is positive 
and marginally significant. This is, at first sight surprising, however this result does not hold 
for a sample of sole proprietorships, suggesting that only those companies where a female is 
one among various owners tend to finance a larger share of their capital using bank finance, 
but that this is not the case for companies solely owned by a female. Similarly, we find there 
is no statistically significant difference in the share of working capital financed by financial 
institutions between businesses with and without female ownership participation (columns 9-
12). There is some marginal evidence that female sole proprietorships use a higher share of 
working capital from financial institutions, though this is significant only at the 10 percent 
level (columns 11 and 12).  However, one strong and robust finding is that Sub-Saharan 
African businesses appear to be less able to access formal financial institutions to finance     11     
 
both investment and working capital, a remarkable difference between six and 14 percentage 
points compared to businesses in other parts of the world. Consistent with previous research 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008), the results also show that larger companies 
have a significant advantage in terms of accessing financial institutions to finance both their 
investments and working capital; an increase in a firm‟s size by 10 percent is associated with 
a 17-18 percentage point increase in the share of its investment or working capital financed 
by financial institutions. These results, however, turn insignificant for the sample with sole 
proprietorship because within this sub-sample the size variation is much smaller as this type 
of companies tends to be characterized by a limited size. Furthermore, we show that 
companies located in a large city tend to finance a larger share of their investment and 
working capital with bank finance, potentially driven by supply of finance more available in 
larger cities as well as “demand” effects driven by the type of companies that locate in larger 
cities. The share of external finance for investment of companies located in a large city is – 
on average - eight percentage points larger than that of other companies, while it is just four 
percentage points larger when focusing on sole proprietorships. Similarly, the share of 
working capital financed externally for companies located in a large city is – on average - 
five percentage points larger for all firms, and 2.5 percentage points for sole proprietorships.  
Having analyzed the results for the entire sample composed by companies in various 
regions, we focus on a sample of companies located in Africa. With this objective in mind we 
test a simpler model described by regression (2) below  
                                                                        
                                                                                                             (2) 
As before Fem is a dummy variable indicating female ownership participation, and Empl is 
the log of the number of employees. Similarly, as before, we include industry and time fixed 
effects, as well as macroeconomic control variables. In robustness tests, we add firm     12     
 
characteristics, and always cluster the standard errors at the country-year level to account for 
autocorrelation.  In addition, when focusing on African countries we are also able to separate 
the sample into formal versus informal enterprises.  In the case of informal enterprises, 
however, we do not include firm size and its interaction with female, as only 2 percent (or 63 
firms) of informal enterprises have more than five employees and the sample of informal 
enterprises presents thus very limited variation. 
  The results in Table 3 show the absence of a statistically significant difference in 
terms of accessing external finance between companies with and without female ownership 
participation in Africa. This result holds for both formal and informal companies, as well as 
for sole proprietorships. The significant positive coefficient in column 5 for informal firms 
turns insignificant once we control for other firm characteristics in a smaller sample.  
Furthermore, we confirm once again that larger companies, as well as older companies are 
more likely to access external finance. A ten percent increase in size translates into a 9.5 to 
11 percent higher probability of accessing formal finance in the overall sample and a seven 
percent higher probability for sole proprietorships. The size effect is stronger for female sole 
proprietorships.  Other firm-level characteristics do not enter consistently with a significant 
coefficient.  
The results in Table 4 confirm that there is no statistically significant difference in 
terms of the share of external finance for investment between companies with and without 
female ownership participation. These results apply both to formal and informal companies, 
and are robust in the sub-sample of sole proprietorships. Additionally, as before we find that 
larger companies tend to be more likely to finance their investments with external resources; 
an increase in the size of a company by 10 percent is correlated with an increase in the use of 
external finance for investments by more than 20 percentage points and more than 13 
percentage points in the case of sole proprietorships.  Unlike in the case of Table 3, the size     13     
 
effect does not vary across sole proprietors of different genders.  None of the other firm 
characteristics enters significantly in Table 4. 
  The results presented in Table 5 confirm our previous findings that firms with female 
ownership participation use as much external finance for working capital as other firms in 
Africa, a result that is consistent across different sub-samples of formal and informal firms 
and of sole proprietorships. As before, we find that larger firms finance a significantly larger 
share of their working capital from financial institutions.  
The  result  that  companies  with  female  ownership  participation  do  not  tend  to  be 
disadvantaged in accessing formal financing channels to cover the costs of investments, or 
working capital, seems at first rather surprising. One possible reason for this may be the 
existence  of  a  selection  bias.  Such  a  selection  bias  would  imply  that  females  are 
discriminated against, de facto or de jure, when trying to establish and run a formal company 
in the first place, so that female entrepreneurs must be particularly capable or, in other words, 
must have characteristics that set them apart from male entrepreneurs owning companies with 
similar characteristics. Gajigo and Hallward-Driemeier (2010) find suggestive evidence in 
four African countries that there is gender differences in capital at the start up. Although 
differences are higher along sector than by gender, the median capital for male entrepreneurs 
is more than twice than female entrepreneurs. This is a suggestive indication that female 
entrepreneurs may face larger entry barriers than their male counterparts, but that once they 
enter, they do not face larger constraints. We assess the possibility of such a bias in four 
ways.   
First, we analyze if indeed it is the case that African countries tend to be characterized 
by a degree of gender discrimination that is different from other regions. Figure 1 shows how 
African countries are ranked in terms of gender discrimination as measured by the Women, 
Business  and  the  Law  index  with  respect  to  other  countries  in  the  world.  This  index,     14     
 
developed by the World Bank Group, varies between 0 and 1. It is constructed by averaging 9 
dummy variables that have a value of 1 if there is gender equality in a specific area and a 0 if 
there is not; lower values indicate therefore more pronounced gender discrimination. The 
dimensions include equality in Law regarding ownership rights, inheritance, capacity before 
the law, rights of married men compared to married women, as well as a set of work related 
issues such as tax liability, industry or work hours discrimination, and within these issues, 
discrimination towards women who are pregnant or nursing. Figure 1 shows that the African 
countries have a Women, Business and the Law index substantially lower than that of the rest 
of the world, with the average index value for African countries being 0.5, while for the rest 
of the world it is 0.85. 
Second, we evaluate to what extent females are likely to establish a formal business. 
For this purpose, Table 6 shows the share of female and male entrepreneurs across different 
legal ownership types. The share of female-owned firms is low in the case of sole 
proprietorships compared with other types of firms. Only 23 percent firms with female 
ownership participation are sole proprietorships compared to 34 percent of firms with male 
ownership participation. This seems to indicate that in our sample women are less likely to be 
entrepreneurs and more likely to be one of several owners of an enterprise.  
Third, we test whether certain enterprise characteristics differ by gender ownership 
participation.  While we cannot test for gender differences in inherent characteristics, we can 
test  for  observable  differences,  such  as  size  or  the  tendency  to  innovate.    We  therefore 
estimate  the  following  regression  where  the  dependent  variables  are  indicators  of  size, 
product innovation and process innovation.  
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The results in Table 7 Panel A point to some significant differences across firms with 
and without female ownership participation in terms of size and tendency to innovate. The 
results in Columns 1-4 suggest that there are important differences between enterprises with 
and without female ownership participation  in terms of size: all things equal, firms with 
female ownership participation tend to be significantly smaller, a result that holds both for the 
overall  sample  and  the  sub-sample  of  sole  proprietorships.
7  Having female ownership 
participation reduces the number of employees, on average, between 8 and 14 percent.    
Having found that size is a key factor positively correlated to access to finance, this may 
explain how, by being small, enterprises with female ownership participation tend to be less 
likely to access finance, while at the same time,  we do not find any statistically sign ificant 
difference between businesses with and without female ownership participation   once we 
control  for  size.   Interestingly,  African  firms  are,  on  ave rage,  not  smaller,  while  sole  
proprietorships are smaller in Africa.  The interaction of the African and  female dummy 
variables is insignificant, suggesting that the smaller size of firms with female ownership 
participation is not more or less pronounced in Africa than in other parts of the world.   In 
addition,  the  results  in  columns  5 -12  show  that  enterpris es  with  female  ownership 
participation  are  significantly  more  likely  to  innovate  than  enterprises  without  female 
ownership participation, both with respect to product and process innovation.  On average, 
firms with female ownership participation are three t o six percent more likely to innovate 
than other firms.  These results hold not only for the overall sample of enterprises, but also 
for the sub-sample of sole proprietorships, though the significance of the female dummy 
drops to 10 percent in the regressions of process innovation (columns 11 and 12). In addition, 
the interaction terms between the Africa and the female dummy variables enter  negatively 
and significantly in the regressions for sole proprietorships, suggesting that female -owned 
                                                 
7 Bruhn (2009) reports similar findings for a sample of Latin American countries.     16     
 
sole proprietorships in Africa are not more likely to innovate than male sole proprietorships 
in Africa.   We also find that, on average, firms in Africa are significantly less likely to 
innovate.  It is important to interpret these findings with caution, though, as the sample for 
which we have information available on innovation is significantly smaller than our overall 
sample, both in terms of countries (31) and in the number of firms within these countries.     
Finally, we test whether female entrepreneurs are more likely to be active in sectors 
with lower needs for external finance. Since the regressions in Tables 2 – 5 focus on intra-
industry variation (as they include industry fixed effects), they are not able to pick up such a 
selection bias.   We therefore run the following regression 
                                              (4) 
where  –  as  above  -  Fem  is  a  dummy  variable  indicating  female  ownership 
participation and Finance is the average of all firms in sector s across all  sample countries: 
(i) a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm has access to a formal financing channel 
(e.g.  overdraft  or  loan),  (ii)  the  share  of  fixed  asset  investment  financed  by  financial 
institutions, and (iii) the share of working capital financed by financial institutions. By using 
averages across countries, we are able to control for reverse causation to a certain extent.  The 
coefficient  thus indicates whether enterprises with female ownership participation are more 
or less likely to operate in sectors that – on average – use more external finance. By including 
country fixed effects, we control for country differences in access to external finance.  
The results in Table 7 Panel B indicate that firms with female ownership participation 
are indeed less likely to operate in sectors where a higher share of firms uses a loan or 
overdraft facility. This finding holds both across the complete sample and the subsample of 
sole proprietorships.   On the other hand, firms with female ownership participation are not 
less likely to operate in sectors that use a higher share of external finance for investment or 
working capital.      17     
 
We interpret the results of Tables 6 and 7 as, on the one hand, partially supporting our 
hypothesis of a selection bias among female entrepreneurs who have to be more capable than 
their male counterparts in order to be part of the formal enterprise universe. On the other 
hand, these results might point towards the fact that a key channel that may explain the 
apparent discrimination between businesses with and without female ownership participation 
could be size, with businesses with female ownership participation more likely to be smaller 
and therefore for this reason less likely to access formal external finance. Furthermore, firms 
with female ownership participation are more likely to operate in sectors where firms – on 
average across countries – are less likely to have a loan, which might point to demand side 
constraints.  
  Concluding, this section shows that while African companies are less likely to access 
formal  financial  institutions  to  finance  their  investments  and  working  capital  needs,   
enterprises with female ownership participation do not appear more financially constrained 
than firms without female ownership participation. However, we find that while companies in 
Africa tend to have substantially more limited access to external finance, larger businesses 
have systematically better access to external finance, and companies with female ownership 
participation tend to be smaller than their counterparts owned purely by males. In addition, 
we find some support towards the fact  that this  lack of difference in  terms of accessing 
finance could be partially explained by the fact that the female entrepreneurs appear to be a 
“selected sample” with characteristics that may explain our findings. To start with, females 
tend to be less likely to be owners of a formal company, and once they are able to break this 
“glass ceiling” it is because female entrepreneurs appear to be significantly more likely to 
innovate both in terms of product and process.   
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3.  Gender and Household Access to Financial Services 
This section explores gender differences in the use of different financial services by 
individuals.  Unlike in the previous section, we therefore focus more on savings and 
payments than credit services. We consider both formal and informal financial services.  This 
section first discusses the data and simple comparisons in the use of financial services by men 
and women, before turning to multivariate regressions.  
 
3.1.  Data and Ocular Econometrics 
To explore the relationship between gender and use of financial services, we use 11 
household surveys across 9 Sub-Saharan African countries, co-branded as FinScope or 
FinAccess surveys. Specifically, we have data for Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, 
Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. These surveys, first undertaken in 
South Africa in 2002, are surveys with up to 7,600 observations and sampled with cluster 
stratified probability.  They are based on individuals rather than households.  While this 
might reduce the accuracy in terms of financial services that the individual has indirect access 
to through other household members and might reduce the representativeness, it has the 
advantage that we can focus specifically on the gender gap (Cull and Scott, 2010). For this 
study, we have a total of 11 surveys available, with Kenya and Tanzania having undertaken 
surveys twice. While South Africa has undertaken yearly surveys, we only include the one 
from 2008.  All surveys used in this section were undertaken between 2004 and 2009.  
The FinScope surveys distinguish between four different population segments – (i) 
users of formal banking services, (ii) users of other formal services, such as insurance 
companies, mobile phone services and regulated MFIs, (iii) users informal financial services, 
including unregulated SACCOs, ASCAs and ROSCAs, and (iv) individuals excluded from 
any service.  There are two ways to explore this differentiation; first, considering each strand     19     
 
separately, i.e. users of formal banking, other formal and informal financial services and, 
second, considering the most formal strand.  In the latter case, one takes into account that 
many users of formal financial services also use informal financial services and so focuses on 
the most formal form of financial service.  In the following, we will follow the first approach, 
focusing on (i) users of formal banking services, (ii) users of informal financial services (who 
could also use formal banking services) and (iii) individuals excluded from formal and 
informal services.  
Figure 2 shows that, on average, women are less likely to use formal financial services 
than men, while gender differences in the use of informal financial services vary across 
countries. Here, we graph the share of surveyed in each country that (i) uses formal banking 
services, (ii) uses informal services, and (iii) is excluded from any financial service, 
separately for men and women. All observations are weighted according to their 
representativeness.   
Panel A shows that women are less likely to use formal banking services across all 11 
surveys, although the gender differences vary across countries. In Botswana (2004), the 
gender gap is less than two percent and not significant, whereas in Kenya (2009), the gender 
gap is 11 percent, with 32 percent of men using formal banking services, but only 21 percent 
of women.  The Panel A graphs also show the large cross-country variation in use of formal 
banking services, documented elsewhere, with almost 70 percent of surveyed in South Africa 
using formal banking services, while only 17 percent using formal banking services in 
Zambia (2005). 
The Panel B graphs show that the gender gap in the use of informal financial services 
varies across countries.  In Kenya (2006 and 2009), South Africa (2008) and Tanzania (2006 
and 2009), women are more likely to use informal financial services than men, while the 
reverse holds in Namibia and Rwanda. The graphs also show the wide-spread variation in the     20     
 
use of informal services across the nine sample countries, ranging from 50 percent in Kenya 
to only 1 percent in Namibia.  
The Panel C graphs show that women are either as likely or more likely to be 
excluded from any financial service as men.  Specifically, in Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Tanzania (2006), Uganda and Zambia, they are more likely to be excluded from any financial 
service, while in the other countries there is no significant difference between men and 
women.   These graphs also indicate the high degree of financial exclusion across Southern 
and Eastern Africa, ranging from 80 percent in Zambia to 19 percent in South Africa.  
  These findings are consistent with the hypothesis of a gender gap in the use of formal 
banking services.  However, they do not control for other individual characteristics. Next, we 
will therefore turn to multi-variate regressions to explore whether this unconditional 
differences still hold once we control for other factors that can explain the use of formal and 
informal financial services. 
 
3.2.  Multiavariate Results  
We next turn to multivariate regression analysis to explore whether the gender 
differences in the use of financial services hold when we control for other characteristics of 
individuals and households. Specifically, we use probit regressions of the following form: 
                                                                                        (5) 
where y is access to financial services measured by the use of (i) formal banking services and 
(ii) informal financial services.  In addition, we use (iii) a dummy variable that indicates 
whether a person is financially excluded, i.e. uses neither formal nor informal financial 
services.  The regression is weighted and stratified on the rural-urban level.  The coefficient 
of interest is , which indicates whether women are more or less likely to use financial 
services.   We run these regressions both survey-by-survey as well as a pooled version with     21     
 
all available surveys and dummy variables for each survey. While the results from the pooled 
regressions gives us an indication of the average effect across surveys, they do not allow for 
slope differences across countries.  In addition to using country-specific weights, we weight 
by the inverse of the respective population in each country in the case of the pooled 
regression.  
We include a wide array of other individual characteristics that might explain 
variation in the use of financial services (see Table 8).  Appendix Table A2 presents the 
descriptive statistics for all characteristics, for each country.  First, we control for geographic 
location by including a dummy variable Rural indicating whether the individual lives in a 
rural district.  Geographic barriers such as larger distance to the nearest bank office would 
suggest a negative relationship between Rural and use of formal financial services, while the 
use of informal financial services might not necessarily vary across different geographic 
areas. We control for the education level of individuals, by including dummy variables that 
indicate whether the individual has (i) no education or less than primary, (ii) primary 
completed, (iii) secondary level completed, and (iv) at least an undergraduate college degree.  
We expect individuals with higher levels of education to be more likely to use formal and 
informal financial services. We also include the Age of the individuals, in logs.  While there 
might be a positive relationship between the age of individuals and the use of financial 
services, this relationship might be non-linear and turn negative at higher ages when 
individuals leave the labor market.  We also include an income measure where available. 
With the exception of Kenya 2006 (no income), Kenya 2009 (individual expenses), and 
Uganda (household income), we include the log of individual monthly income.
8  We expect 
higher-income individuals to be more likely to be able to afford formal financial services, 
while the relationship of income with the use of informal financial services is not clear a-
                                                 
8 In the case of the pooled regression, we convert all income measures into USD, using average-year exchange 
rates.     22     
 
priori. Finally, we include dummy variables indicating what the main income source of the 
individual is.  Specifically, Employed, Self-employed and Agriculture are dummy variables 
indicating the employment status and sector, with the omitted category being dependent on 
pension or family. We also control for the ownership of a mobile phone, which might 
indicate stronger commercial needs and therefore demand for financial services.  It might also 
indicate, however, openness to new technologies and therefore bank delivery channels.  
We control for the personal circumstances of the individual by including dummy 
variables for being married, whether the survey respondent is head of household and – where 
available – whether the respondent is the main earner and decision taker.  All four factors 
might increase the probability of using financial services, be they formal or informal, as being 
married and/or being head of household imply stronger economic responsibilities. Where 
available, we also include a variable indicating risk aversion, which is a positive response to 
the question: “do you disagree that to get ahead on life one need to take some risks?”.  We 
also include an indicator of numeracy, which measures the extent to which the respondent 
can solve simple calculus problems. We again expect respondents that score higher on 
numeracy are more likely to use financial services.   
The results in Table 9 show that - on average – women are not significantly more or 
less likely to use formal financial services. We report first the pooled regression with survey 
dummies and then 11 survey-specific regressions.  The pooled regression includes only 
variables that are available for all surveys.  The regression in column 1 of Table 9 shows an 
insignificant coefficient on the female dummy.  This is confirmed by considering the country-
level regressions.  Only in the 2008 survey for South Africa does the female dummy enter 
significantly and negatively, suggesting that females have a 12.2 percent lower probability of 
using formal financial services.  Unlike in the univariate comparisons of Figure 2, we     23     
 
therefore cannot find a gender gap in the use of formal banking services, once we control for 
other individual characteristics. 
  The use of formal banking services is correlated with an array of other individual 
factors. Individuals with higher income are more likely to use formal banking services, as are 
users of mobile phones. Even controlling for the fact that users of mobile phones have, on 
average, higher incomes, they are, on average across our sample countries, 32.1 percent more 
likely to use formal banking services.  Formally employed individuals are more likely to use 
formal banking services, while there is no consistent relationship across countries in the case 
of self-employed and individuals working in agriculture. Perhaps surprisingly, rural 
individuals are less likely to use formal banking services only in Kenya, Malawi, South 
Africa, and Tanzania (2006), while there does not seem to be any urban-rural gap in the other 
countries, with rural inhabitants even more likely to use formal banking services in 
Botswana. Education is a strong predictor of the use of banking services, with the use 
increasing linearly in most countries – with the notable exception of South Africa -, from 
individuals with primary education to individuals with secondary education to individuals 
with tertiary education. Older individuals are more likely to use formal banking services in 
almost all countries. We find that married individuals are more likely to use formal banking 
services in Botswana and Namibia.  With respect to the household status of individuals, we 
find that being the household head does not increase the probability of using formal banking 
services, except in Uganda.  Risk aversion is not significantly correlated with the use of 
banking services except for Botswana where it is negatively correlated, while numeracy is 
positively associated with the use of formal banking services in most but not all countries; 
these two variables, however, are not available for all countries.  
The survey dummies in the pooled regression provide evidence for the cross-country 
variation in the use of financial services beyond differences in population composition. We     24     
 
find that relative to South Africa – the omitted country – all countries except for Namibia 
have lower levels of financial service use.  The differences range from 41 percent in Zambia 
to 20 percent in Botswana.  Individuals in Namibia are as likely to use formal banking 
services as individuals in South Africa.   
  The results in Table 10 show that – on average across the 11 surveys – women are 
more likely to use informal financial services. The effect is also economically large, with 
women being 3.7 percent more likely to use informal financial services than men. Looking 
behind the average effect across countries, we find that this is driven by Botswana and the 
East African countries in our sample, with the effect being especially strong in Kenya (14.7 
percent in 2006 and 16.3 percent in 2009).  On the other hand, there is no gender difference 
in the use of informal financial services in Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia.   
Many of the individual characteristics that explain the use of formal banking services 
also explain the use of informal financial services. The relationship between income and the 
use of informal financial services is positive in some but not all countries.  In some countries 
owners of mobile phones are more likely to use informal financial services while in others it 
does not make a difference or they are less likely (Rwanda and Zambia). Maybe surprisingly, 
compared to individuals dependent on transfers, employed individuals are more likely to use 
informal finance in Botswana, Kenya, and Zambia as are self-employed in Kenya and 
Tanzania (2006), while individuals working in agriculture are only more likely to use 
informal financial services in Kenya. Rural people in Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania 
(2006) are more likely to use informal finance, while they are less likely to do so in Tanzania 
(2009). The relationship between education and the use of informal financial services is not 
consistent across countries. While in Botswana, Kenya, and Tanzania (2009), individuals 
with primary education are more likely to use informal financial services than individuals 
without any formal education, individuals with secondary or tertiary education are not more     25     
 
likely to do so except for Botswana (and Uganda in the case of tertiary education).   Older 
people are more likely to use informal finance only in Botswana, while they are less likely to 
do so in Rwanda and Tanzania (2009). Married individuals are more likely to use informal 
financial services in most, though not all, countries, with the exception of South Africa where 
they are less likely to do so.  If individuals are the main earner in the household, they are 
more likely to use informal financial services in Tanzania (2009), but less likely in Malawi 
and Tanzania (2006).  The main decision maker is more likely to use informal financial 
services only in Kenya (2009). There is no significant relationship between risk aversion and 
the likelihood of using informal financial services, while higher numeracy is positively 
associated with the use of informal financial services in Botswana, Malawi, and Tanzania 
(2006) and negatively in Uganda. The survey dummies in the pooled regression suggest that 
individuals in most countries are more likely to use to informal financial services than 
individuals in South Africa, while individuals in Namibia are less likely to do so and there is 
no significant difference in Zambia.  
  Table 11 shows that, on average, women are less likely to be excluded from financial 
services, with significant cross-country variation behind the result from the pooled 
regression.  Specifically, women in Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, are less likely 
to be excluded from financial services (note that women in these same countries are more 
likely to use informal financial services), while women in Rwanda and South Africa are more 
likely to be excluded, although this relationship is significant only on the 10 percent level.  
There is no significant gender gap in financial exclusion in the other countries.  
  The other individual characteristics that are significantly correlated with the use of 
formal and informal financial services are also significantly correlated with the likelihood of 
being excluded, though with the opposite sign. Higher income individuals are less likely to be 
excluded, and controlling for this income effect, owners of mobile phones are less likely to be     26     
 
excluded. Self-employed are less likely to be excluded in Kenya, Namibia, Rwanda and 
Tanzania (2006), while agricultural workers are more likely to be excluded in Botswana and 
less likely in Kenya and Malawi. Individuals living in rural areas face a lower probability of 
exclusion in Malawi, while a higher probability in Tanzania (2009), with no geographic gap 
in other countries. Education is an important predictor of the likelihood of not being 
excluded, with the relationship between the likelihood of exclusion and educational 
attainment decreasing in a linear measure in all countries, except for South Africa.   Older 
individuals are less likely to be excluded in many though not all countries, as are formally 
employed individuals. Married individuals are less likely to be excluded in most countries, 
while heads of household are no more or less likely to be excluded, with the exception of 
Kenya (2006) and Uganda, where the relationship is negative, and Malawi where the 
relationship is positive.  Numeracy is negatively associated with the likelihood of exclusion 
in many though not all countries, while there seems to be an inconsistent relationship with 
risk aversion, negative in South Africa and positive in Zambia. The survey dummies in the 
pooled regression suggest that with the exception of Kenya (2006), where there is no 
significant difference, the probability of exclusion is higher in all countries compared to 
South Africa.   
Table 12 explores why the significant variation in the use of formal financial services 
between men and women, shown in Figure 2, turns insignificant once we control for other 
individual characteristics.  Here we present the differences in individual characteristics 
between men and women for each survey and the economic effect this has on the different 
use of formal banking services by men and women. Specifically, for the pooled regression 
and each individual survey regression of Table 9, we multiply the coefficient estimate on 
each explanatory variable with the sample difference between male and female individuals.   
The biggest effect seems to come from income differences between male and female     27     
 
individuals, explaining between 0.9 percentage points in Uganda and 4.5 percentage points in 
Tanzania (2006). Another big effect stems from the lower level of education of women, 
which can explain why women are less likely to use formal banking services.  Adding the 
economic effect of lower education across primary, secondary and tertiary education levels in 
the pooled regression, we find a total effect of 4.5 percentage points. Another large effect 
comes from women being less likely to be the household head, accounting for a 3.2 
percentage point difference in the pooled regression.    The employment status is another 
important factor explaining gender differences in the use of formal banking services. Women 
are less likely to be formally employed than men, with the economic effect being 3.1 
percentage points in the pooled regression. Finally, the ownership of mobile phones seems a 
significant factor in explaining the univariate gender gap in use of formal banking services, 
adding another two percentage points. 
  Overall, the results in Table 12 suggest that the fact that women have lower income, 
are less formally educated, are less likely to be head of household and are less likely to be 
formally employed across the countries in our sample explains why they are less likely to use 
formal banking services.  This suggests that it is not discrimination in the banking system or 
lower inherent demand by women that drives their lower use of banking services, but rather 
disadvantages in other areas.  However, these results also suggest that some of the findings 
might be driven by the survey methodology of interviewing individuals rather than 
households; women might have indirect access to formal financial services through their 
formally employed husbands who function as household heads.   
In sensitivity tests not shown
9, we also explored whether the relationship between 
education, income, household head and married, on the one hand, and the use of financial 
services, on the other hand, varied between men and women. Few of the interaction terms, 
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however, enter significantly, and mostly with differing signs across surveys.  Overall, there 
seems little evidence that education and marital status are differently related with use of 
financial services across genders. We also differentiated according to the financial service 
individuals are or are not using – credit, savings, insurance and transaction services.  Here we 
follow the definition by Porteous (2007) that captures both formal and semi-formal financial 
service providers. We find that females in Malawi and Tanzania (2006) are more likely to use 
transaction services, while there is no significant difference at the 5 percent level in other 
countries. Females in Botswana, Kenya and Zambia are more likely to use savings services, 
while they are less likely to use them in Rwanda. There are no significant gender differences 
in credit and insurance services
10.    
 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper assesses gender differences in the use of financial services by enterprises 
and households in Sub-Saharan Africa. We find little if any evidence for a gender gap, either 
for enterprises or households.  Enterprises with female ownership participation in Sub-
Saharan Africa use as much external financing as enterprises without female ownership 
participation and female individuals are as likely to use formal financial services as male 
individuals, once we control for an array of other characteristics. While this might seem 
surprising, our results suggest that one has to look beyond simple gender comparisons and 
explore the reasons why we find a lower financial market participation of women.  In the case 
of enterprises, there is evidence of selection bias, i.e., female entrepreneurs have to overcome 
higher barriers in the first place, as evidenced by their higher tendency to innovate and higher 
legal burden in African countries compared to their male peers.  Further, firms with female 
ownership participation tend to be of smaller size, and smaller firms have, on average, less 
                                                 
10 Results available upon request.     29     
 
access to external finance. Additionally, we find some limited evidence that females owned 
business tend to enter more likely sectors that, on average, are characterized by more limited 
use of external finance (i.e. average number of companies with bank accounts).   In the case 
of individuals, univariate comparisons show a lower formal financial sector participation rate 
of females as they score lower on many other dimensions related to the use of financial 
services, including income, education and formal employment, but also personal life factors 
such as not being head of household. These barriers that women face as individuals to access 
formal financial services might also explain the selection bias among female entrepreneurs 
that we found in the first part of the paper.  
Are women disadvantaged in access to financial services?  Yes, but the reasons are 
not within the financial sector, they lie in other dimensions related to female participation in 
the modern market economy. Policies to expand access to financial services by women have 
to address these other dimensions if women are to reap the benefit of financial services as 
much as men.  
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Table 1. Panel A. Summary Statistics Enterprise Surveys
Variable  Variable description n. obs. share st.dev. min max
Female At least 1 principal owner is female 35,135 0.36 0.48 0 1
Africa Firm is in an Africa country 35,135 0.30 0.46 0 1
Micro 1-5 employees 35,135 0.13 0.33 0 1
Small 6-10 employees 35,135 0.23 0.42 0 1
Medium 11-49 employees 35,135 0.38 0.49 0 1
Large 50 or more employees 35,135 0.27 0.44 0 1
public Government ownership 35,135 0.05 0.22 0 1
private, limited Private, limited ownership 35,135 0.55 0.50 0 1
sole proprietor Sole proprietor 35,135 0.30 0.46 0 1
partnership Partnership ownership 35,135 0.07 0.26 0 1
other Other ownership 35,135 0.02 0.14 0 1
Fin_Formal 1 if overdraft or checking/saving account or creditline or loan 35,135 0.55 0.50 0 1
Fin_inv % New investments paid w/ (priv or gvmt) banks or fin.inst. 18,807 17.54 33.04 0 100
Fin_wkcap % Working capital paid w/ (priv or gvmt) banks or fin.inst. 24,791 9.18 21.36 0 100
logEmployment Number of permanent workers -log 35,135 3.13 1.38 0 9.94
Innov_prod Firm improved products in last 3yrs 9,375 0.61 0.49 0 1
Innov_proc Firm improved production process in last 3yrs 9,385 0.57 0.49 0 1
lgCity Firm is in the capital or city w/ population of 1Mn or more 35,135 0.40 0.49 0 1
Age Age of firm -log 34,827 2.46 0.85 0 5.74
Exporter Firm exports directly at least 10% of total sales 35,086 0.13 0.34 0 1
Foreign at least 10% of firm is owned by foreign private sector 35,032 0.10 0.31 0 1
Index Women-
Business&Law
1 1=equality; 0=no equality; 
79 0.71 0.26 0.13 1
1 average: property, inheritance,  law, work all industries;  same night hrs; married women; tax liability; pregnant, nursing women 
Table 1.Panel B. Distibution of Companies with some Female Ownership
All Countries Africa
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Sole Proprietors
n. obs 7,714 2,861 10,575 4,648 1,447 6,095
% 72.95 27.05 100 76 24 100
Formal 
n. obs 22,602 12,533 35,135 7,724 2,984 10,708
% 64.33 35.67 100 72 28 100
Informal
n. obs 1,388 678 2,066
% 67.18 32.82 100
Total
n. obs 22,602 12,533 35,135 9,112 3,662 12,774
% 64.33     35.67     100        71.33 28.67 100    33     
 
 
Table 2: Explaining Share of Investment and Working Capital Financed by External Financial Institution (Formal Companies)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Access to formal Finance Share Investment Financed Externally Share Work. capital Financed Externally
Formal Sole Proprietor Formal Sole Proprietor Formal Sole Proprietor
Female -0.026 -0.028 -0.091 -0.086 -0.928 -0.706 -1.373 -1.502 1.833 1.653 5.982 6.082
[0.033] [0.032] [0.055] [0.053] [1.959] [1.827] [4.562] [4.437] [1.232] [1.198] [3.342]* [3.309]*
Africa -0.464 -0.456 -0.306 -0.293 -13.183 -14.533 -13.950 -13.636 -7.342 -7.572 -6.942 -6.467
[0.054]*** [0.054]*** [0.051]*** [0.051]*** [3.293]*** [3.148]*** [3.607]*** [3.588]*** [2.882]** [2.611]*** [2.352]*** [2.339]***
Employment 0.065 0.060 0.096 0.096 1.705 1.796 1.282 1.303 1.882 1.774 1.239 1.432
[0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.020]*** [0.018]*** [0.357]*** [0.403]*** [1.104] [1.090] [0.471]*** [0.470]*** [1.210] [1.183]
Female*Africa 0.074 0.076 0.066 0.067 4.761 4.777 -0.104 0.823 -0.407 -0.283 -4.638 -4.563
[0.045] [0.043]* [0.061] [0.060] [2.562]* [2.424]* [5.572] [5.390] [1.594] [1.524] [3.500] [3.503]
Female*Employment 0.013 0.012 0.032 0.029 0.299 0.252 -0.142 -0.125 -0.404 -0.372 -2.429 -2.506
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.016]** [0.016]* [0.445] [0.413] [1.542] [1.502] [0.436] [0.399] [1.337]* [1.308]*
Afr*Employment 0.067 0.061 -0.015 -0.021 1.155 1.033 -0.021 -0.425 -0.383 -0.628 -0.374 -0.757
[0.017]*** [0.016]*** [0.027] [0.024] [1.432] [1.496] [1.255] [1.205] [0.861] [0.844] [1.190] [1.163]
Female*Africa*Employment -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.508 -0.653 1.198 0.810 0.084 0.005 1.888 1.849
[0.015] [0.015] [0.020] [0.021] [0.926] [0.912] [2.188] [2.128] [0.602] [0.565] [1.414] [1.405]
private-limited 0.093 0.095 6.096 5.555 1.701 1.698
[0.020]*** [0.021]*** [1.944]*** [1.778]*** [1.294] [1.174]
sole-proprietors -0.029 -0.026 3.032 2.864 -1.244 -0.974
[0.029] [0.029] [1.820] [1.706]* [1.455] [1.348]
partnership 0.020 0.024 4.979 4.605 -0.280 -0.056
[0.023] [0.021] [2.394]** [2.095]** [1.442] [1.335]
legal-status_other 0.008 0.008 9.454 9.495 5.265 5.155
[0.036] [0.035] [3.706]** [3.690]** [1.772]*** [1.847]***
age 0.024 0.020 -0.118 1.167 0.538 0.398
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.384] [0.572]** [0.305]* [0.316]
lgcity 0.056 0.043 8.348 4.227 5.349 2.458
[0.027]** [0.026] [2.511]*** [1.908]** [1.466]*** [1.195]**
exporter 0.070 0.031 2.623 -0.330 2.761 -0.606
[0.029]** [0.029] [1.649] [1.632] [1.359]** [1.217]
foreign -0.036 -0.047 -4.026 1.804 -2.362 -1.097
[0.020]* [0.049] [1.332]*** [2.736] [0.874]*** [1.190]
industry fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country controls
1 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.452 0.361 0.340 0.263 11.665 6.414 16.705 12.315 16.682 11.994 13.848 11.512
[0.085]*** [0.089]*** [0.066]*** [0.075]*** [4.153]*** [3.703]* [4.416]*** [4.252]*** [3.926]*** [3.579]*** [3.200]*** [3.188]***
Observations 35135 34684 10575 10505 18807 18604 4469 4446 24791 24615 9242 9203
R-squared 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.09
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: cols 1-4 dprobit; cols 5-12 OLS; omitted category public; se clustered at the country level
1 controls include GDP per capita, GDP growth previous 3 years and inflation    34     
 
 
   
Table 3: Explaining Access to Formal Financing (Africa Only) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Formal Firms Informal
All Formal Sole Proprietor All Informal Sole Proprietor
Female 0.034 0.032 -0.028 -0.024 0.041 0.007 0.030 -0.003
[0.030] [0.028] [0.022] [0.023] [0.018]** [0.016] [0.017] [0.026]
Employment 0.110 0.095 0.073 0.067
[0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.017]*** [0.015]***
Fem*Employment 0.005 0.005 0.022 0.020
[0.012] [0.011] [0.010]** [0.011]*
private-limited 0.031 0.035 0.192
[0.041] [0.044] [0.038]***
sole-proprietors -0.109 -0.102 0.153 -0.112
[0.054]* [0.055]* [0.030]*** [0.066]
partnership -0.039 -0.030 0.214 -0.028
[0.045] [0.043] [0.028]*** [0.058]
legal-status_other -0.026 -0.020
[0.113] [0.108]
age 0.028 0.021 0.036 0.030
[0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.012]*
lgcity 0.017 0.014 -0.073 -0.058
[0.023] [0.023] [0.027]* [0.022]*
exporter 0.129 0.069 0.166 -0.066
[0.023]*** [0.032]** [0.087] [0.067]
foreign -0.030 0.002 -0.105 -0.030
[0.026] [0.023] [0.056] [0.057]
industry fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country controls
1 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.061 -0.008 0.052 0.006 -0.011 0.073 0.109 0.085
[0.103] [0.096] [0.116] [0.119] [0.088] [0.189] [0.083] [0.148]
Observations 10708 10670 6095 6081 1962 604 1575 483
R-squared 0.25 0.26 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.05
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: se clustered at the country level    35     
 
 
   
Table 4: Explaining Share of Investment Financed by External Financial Institutions  (Africa Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Formal  Informal
All formal Sole Proprietor All Informal Sole Proprietor
Female 3.045 2.785 -0.866 -0.665 -0.555 -2.806 -1.345 -2.040
[1.742]* [1.699] [3.328] [3.189] [1.852] [2.420] [1.448] [1.455]
Employment 2.347 2.022 1.373 1.319
[0.867]** [0.844]** [0.566]** [0.578]**
Fem*Employment -0.187 -0.087 0.896 0.789
[0.818] [0.802] [1.581] [1.514]
private-limited 1.238 1.214 14.987 5.173
[3.954] [4.125] [8.245]* [5.477]
sole-proprietors -4.637 -4.338 5.730 -5.861
[4.320] [4.462] [4.476] [2.833]




age -0.363 0.010 2.809 1.824
[0.534] [0.620] [1.198]* [0.927]
lgcity -0.085 1.829 -10.564 -0.241
[1.969] [1.596] [3.233]** [1.975]
exporter 4.147 -2.281 -3.249 -0.486
[2.799] [1.858] [2.650] [0.817]
foreign 1.225 3.706 3.280 -1.952
[2.201] [2.970] [5.958] [1.587]
industry fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country controls
1 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 9.715 9.758 7.128 6.276 -7.171 32.481 1.175 8.959
[9.021] [9.237] [8.752] [8.516] [4.532] [11.654]** [0.845] [3.714]*
Observations 4749 4733 2426 2421 604 211 484 173
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.09
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: se clustered at the country level
1 controls include GDP per capita, GDP growth previous 3 years and inflation    36     
 
 
   
Table 5: Explaining Share of Working Capital Financed by External Financial Institutions  (Africa Only) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Formal  Informal
All formal Sole Proprietor All Informal Sole Proprietor
Female 1.503 1.423 1.221 1.272 1.185 0.800 0.560 -0.115
[0.976] [0.947] [0.884] [0.921] [0.982] [1.451] [0.854] [0.383]
Employment 1.442 1.267 1.049 1.023
[0.510]*** [0.467]** [0.339]*** [0.318]***
Fem*Employment -0.295 -0.281 -0.450 -0.480
[0.389] [0.385] [0.417] [0.440]
private-limited -0.075 -0.165 1.328
[1.932] [2.032] [0.902]
sole-proprietors -3.015 -3.090 1.684 -1.088
[2.070] [2.174] [0.621]** [1.093]
partnership -2.662 -2.685 4.591 4.670
[1.991] [2.071] [1.519]*** [2.296]
legal-status_other -2.692 -2.693
[2.973] [3.011]
age 0.065 0.125 0.932 0.467
[0.213] [0.163] [0.402]* [0.170]*
lgcity 0.812 0.396 -3.930 -3.114
[1.068] [0.741] [1.723]* [2.263]
exporter 2.520 -0.162 0.136 0.108
[1.044]** [0.663] [0.444] [0.886]
foreign -0.669 -0.461 -0.597 0.113
[0.928] [0.575] [0.310] [0.270]
industry fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country controls
1 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 6.799 6.373 2.612 2.270 -1.071 4.064 0.977 4.160
[3.018]** [3.271]* [2.598] [2.589] [2.228] [3.722] [1.391] [1.871]*
Observations 10696 10658 6091 6077 1953 604 1570 483
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.02 0.14
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: se clustered at the country level
1 controls include GDP per capita, GDP growth previous 3 years and inflation    37     
 
 
   
Table 6. Distribution Legal Ownership 
status Male Female Total
public obs 969 887 1,856
% 4.29 7.08 5.28
private, limited obs 11,994 7,469 19,463
% 53.07 59.59 55.39
sole proprietor obs 7,714 2,861 10,575
% 34.13 22.83 30.10
partnership obs 1,516 1,022 2,538
% 6.71 8.15 7.22
other obs 409 294 703
% 1.81 2.35 2.00
Total obs 22,602 12,533 35,135
% 100 100 100    38     
 
 
   
Table 7. Panel A: Characteristics of Formal Enterprises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dep var Log-Employment
All Sole Proprietor All All
Female -0.083 -0.078 -0.110 -0.139 0.060 0.058 0.070 0.080 0.036 0.034 0.046 0.050
[0.031]*** [0.038]** [0.048]** [0.059]** [0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.031]** [0.028]*** [0.015]** [0.016]** [0.027]* [0.025]*
Africa -0.146 -0.198 -0.270 -0.371 -0.108 -0.114 -0.095 -0.088 -0.192 -0.198 -0.203 -0.206
[0.096] [0.109]* [0.115]** [0.133]*** [0.038]*** [0.042]** [0.056] [0.061] [0.036]*** [0.038]***[0.051]***[0.051]***
Female*Africa -0.020 -0.050 -0.007 0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.088 -0.094 0.015 0.017 -0.081 -0.082
[0.049] [0.053] [0.075] [0.085] [0.032] [0.030] [0.041]** [0.042]** [0.029] [0.028] [0.038]** [0.037]**
age 0.324 0.157 0.022 0.001 0.016 0.003
[0.022]*** [0.017]*** [0.008]** [0.012] [0.007]** [0.015]
lgcity -0.004 0.090 0.029 0.070 0.019 0.049
[0.057] [0.054] [0.021] [0.031]** [0.021] [0.031]
exporter 0.791 1.040 0.133 0.224 0.133 0.139
[0.052]*** [0.106]*** [0.035]*** [0.058]*** [0.029]*** [0.039]***
foreign 0.577 0.597 0.021 0.067 0.021 0.001
[0.055]*** [0.127]*** [0.022] [0.077] [0.020] [0.094]
private-limited -0.737 -0.940 0.003 -0.019 -0.048 -0.070
[0.083]*** [0.093]*** [0.033] [0.036] [0.023]** [0.025]***
sole-proprietors -1.519 -1.923 -0.130 -0.188 -0.175 -0.230
[0.100]*** [0.100]*** [0.042]*** [0.053]*** [0.029]*** [0.037]***
partnership -1.031 -1.330 -0.077 -0.125 -0.155 -0.203
[0.099]*** [0.104]*** [0.065] [0.074] [0.041]*** [0.047]***
legal-status_other -0.827 -1.011 -0.005 -0.022 -0.086 -0.101
[0.126]*** [0.144]*** [0.057] [0.061] [0.035]** [0.038]**
industry fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country controls
1 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 3.244 4.561 2.000 2.578 0.501 0.644 0.522 0.584 0.579 0.696 0.578 0.628
[0.144]*** [0.144]*** [0.173]*** [0.170]*** [0.062]*** [0.058]***[0.090]***[0.099]*** [0.070]*** [0.053]***[0.054]***[0.059]***
Observations 34684 35135 10505 10575 9294 9392 2964 2984 9303 9402 2966 2986
R-squared 0.35 0.25 0.22 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
omitted category public; se clustered at the country level; 
1 controls include GDP per capita, GDP growth previous 3 years and inflation
Product Innovation Process Innovation




   
Table 7. Panel B: Industry Specific Access to Finance of Female Formal Enterprises
Probit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







country fe yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.764 -0.992 -1.100 -0.517 -1.038 -1.197
[0.090]*** [0.059]*** [0.036]*** [0.148]*** [0.118]*** [0.083]***
Observations 36877 36877 36877 11363 11363 11363
Pseudo-Rsq 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




   
Table 8. Summary Statistics Household Surveys
Variable  Variable description n. obs. mean st.dev. min max
Banking uses now banking services 43908 0.23 0.42 0 1
Informal uses now unregistered financial services 43908 0.27 0.45 0 1
Excluded not banked; not formal or informal financial institutions 43908 0.57 0.49 0 1
Female 1 if respondent female 43908 0.53 0.50 0 1
Married 1 if married 43905 0.59 0.49 0 1
HH_head 1 if household head 43897 0.46 0.50 0 1
No-education less than primary 43240 0.29 0.45 0 1
Primary primary complete (and) less than secondary complete 43240 0.47 0.50 0 1
Secondary secondary or vocational training complete (and) less than tertiary complete 43240 0.20 0.40 0 1
Tertiary tertiary complete or more 43240 0.03 0.16 0 1
Numeracy does not know what inflation is 35590 0.41 0.49 0 1
Owns_mobile owns/uses pre-paid or contract cell phone 43883 0.33 0.47 0 1
Age_log age (years) -log 43736 3.51 0.40 2.77 4.65
Employed (main) source of income is from a wage (company or individual) 43908 0.18 0.39 0 1
Self_employed (main) source of income is from own business  43908 0.17 0.38 0 1
Agriculture (main) source of income is from selling agricultural, livestock or fishing products 40008 0.40 0.49 0 1
Riskaverse disagree that 'to get ahead on life one need to take some risks' 13257 0.24 0.43 0 1
Rural lives in a rural area 43908 0.65 0.48 0 1
Earner 1 if household main earner 25962 0.69 0.46 0 1
Decision_mkr makes financial decisions (self or with spouse) 25859 0.74 0.44 0 1
log_income log individual monthly income -LCU (ALL in USD) 31151 2.93 3.47 -9.10 9.37
region number identifying different regions 43908 8.0 11.1 1 55
weight weights 42708 3189.2 4806.8 0.026 122826    41     
 
 
   
Table 9. Use of Banking Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ALL Botswana Kenya06 Kenya09 Malawi Namibia Rwanda SouthAfrica Tanzania06 Tanzania09 Uganda Zambia
Female 0.017 0.029 0.039 -0.015 0.026 -0.015 -0.002 -0.122 -0.004 -0.003 -0.018 -0.001
[0.018] [0.041] [0.042] [0.030] [0.018] [0.040] [0.022] [0.051]** [0.010] [0.008] [0.025] [0.003]
Rural 0.001 0.174 -0.142 -0.069 -0.057 -0.045 -0.016 -0.066 -0.024 -0.003 -0.004 0.004
[0.020] [0.084]** [0.038]*** [0.029]** [0.022]*** [0.049] [0.020] [0.038]* [0.013]* [0.009] [0.029] [0.003]
Primary 0.186 0.250 0.020 0.152 -0.013 0.095 0.112 0.205 0.043 0.025 0.086 0.010
[0.026]*** [0.061]*** [0.036] [0.034]*** [0.018] [0.068] [0.021]*** [0.059]*** [0.025]* [0.010]** [0.028]*** [0.007]
Secondary 0.437 0.370 0.333 0.338 0.144 0.232 0.421 0.312 0.105 0.174 0.308 0.118
[0.026]*** [0.067]*** [0.046]*** [0.041]*** [0.032]*** [0.071]*** [0.098]*** [0.055]*** [0.026]*** [0.037]*** [0.066]*** [0.052]**
Tertiary 0.655 0.521 0.704 0.563 0.614 0.846 0.257 0.641 0.682 0.399 0.572
[0.022]*** [0.079]*** [0.060]*** [0.069]*** [0.102]*** [0.064]*** [0.027]*** [0.206]*** [0.102]*** [0.171]** [0.207]***
Age 0.256 0.198 0.226 0.200 0.051 0.105 0.072 0.255 0.024 0.044 -0.017 0.021
[0.030]*** [0.083]** [0.046]*** [0.040]*** [0.022]** [0.070] [0.025]*** [0.075]*** [0.012]** [0.011]*** [0.038] [0.011]*
Income 0.077 0.146 0.036 0.046 0.033 0.026 0.031 0.010 0.036 0.004
[0.010]*** [0.017]*** [0.005]*** [0.009]*** [0.014]** [0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.003]*** [0.008]*** [0.001]***
Employed 0.404 0.115 0.185 0.130 0.134 0.374 0.125 0.153 0.024 0.095 0.010 0.052
[0.019]*** [0.055]** [0.046]*** [0.038]*** [0.034]*** [0.049]*** [0.076]* [0.054]*** [0.016] [0.035]*** [0.044] [0.026]**
Self_employed 0.227 -0.018 0.120 0.074 -0.005 0.189 0.191 0.042 -0.009 -0.013 -0.051 0.008
[0.027]*** [0.070] [0.057]** [0.039]* [0.027] [0.061]*** [0.081]** [0.087] [0.011] [0.010] [0.034] [0.007]
Agriculture -0.202 0.185 0.068 0.051 -0.029 0.038 -0.021 -0.045 -0.092 0.001
[0.075]*** [0.079]** [0.037]* [0.022]** [0.097] [0.033] [0.012]* [0.013]*** [0.035]*** [0.004]
Owns_mobile 0.321 0.198 0.308 0.297 0.183 0.306 0.085 0.110 0.041 0.123 0.293 0.026
[0.021]*** [0.044]*** [0.039]*** [0.024]*** [0.020]*** [0.046]*** [0.053] [0.056]** [0.016]** [0.018]*** [0.033]*** [0.015]*
Married 0.099 0.125 0.031 -0.035 -0.018 0.149 0.021 -0.032 0.005 0.009 -0.006 0.003
[0.020]*** [0.063]** [0.037] [0.030] [0.020] [0.051]*** [0.021] [0.051] [0.010] [0.008] [0.023] [0.003]
HH_head 0.081 -0.013 -0.014 0.026 -0.005 0.040 0.005 -0.027 -0.004 0.002 0.042 -0.000
[0.021]*** [0.061] [0.036] [0.036] [0.020] [0.050] [0.022] [0.058] [0.010] [0.009] [0.025]* [0.005]
Earner 0.113 0.014 0.030 -0.916 -0.022 -0.001
[0.058]* [0.031] [0.046] [0.097]*** [0.021] [0.005]
Decision_taker 0.112 0.027 0.053 0.011 -0.004
[0.033]*** [0.019] [0.027]* [0.010] [0.007]
Riskaverse -0.087 0.027 0.017 0.003 -0.004
[0.045]* [0.043] [0.047] [0.027] [0.003]
Numeracy 0.061 0.101 0.141 0.128 0.032 0.017 0.020 0.121 0.006





















regional f.e.  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 43044 974 4237 6589 4712 1065 1894 3345 3097 5864 1587 3152
pseudo-r2 0.42 0.37 0.38 0.46 0.36 0.47 0.33 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.41 0.58
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Uganda06: household income; Kenya09: expenses; pooled regresions log-income (USD)    42     
 
 
   
Table 10. Use of Informal Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ALL Botswana Kenya06 Kenya09 Malawi Namibia Rwanda SouthAfrica Tanzania06 Tanzania09 Uganda Zambia
Female 0.037 0.115 0.147 0.163 -0.012 -0.000 -0.084 0.012 0.127 0.063 0.058 0.003
[0.006]***[0.034]***[0.041]***[0.029]*** [0.018] [0.000] [0.038]** [0.012] [0.026]*** [0.019]*** [0.027]** [0.002]
Rural 0.009 -0.072 0.010 0.002 0.191 0.000 0.008 0.043 0.079 -0.051 0.018 0.001
[0.007] [0.065] [0.037] [0.031] [0.017]*** [0.001] [0.039] [0.015]*** [0.036]** [0.025]** [0.036] [0.003]
Primary 0.016 0.183 0.098 0.075 -0.009 -0.001 -0.034 -0.011 -0.009 0.074 0.029 0.004
[0.008]** [0.051]*** [0.042]** [0.030]** [0.017] [0.002] [0.030] [0.012] [0.037] [0.021]*** [0.027] [0.003]
Secondary 0.015 0.178 -0.135 -0.040 -0.048 -0.001 -0.156 -0.035 -0.015 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
[0.009]* [0.063]***[0.051]*** [0.038] [0.025]* [0.001] [0.047]*** [0.013]*** [0.039] [0.037] [0.048] [0.003]
Tertiary 0.043 0.267 -0.063 -0.221 -0.139 -0.000 -0.031 -0.045 -0.193 0.296 -0.004
[0.023]* [0.105]** [0.093] [0.066]***[0.037]*** [0.000] [0.005]*** [0.106] [0.029]*** [0.151]** [0.004]
Age 0.045 0.354 -0.059 -0.044 0.007 -0.000 -0.083 0.005 -0.042 -0.071 -0.000 -0.000
[0.009]***[0.063]*** [0.048] [0.035] [0.021] [0.001] [0.043]* [0.012] [0.032] [0.026]*** [0.034] [0.004]
Income 0.024 0.031 0.006 0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.037 0.006 0.011 0.001
[0.009]*** [0.013]** [0.003]** [0.000] [0.010] [0.001] [0.011]*** [0.004]* [0.008] [0.000]**
Owns_mobile 0.033 0.143 0.009 0.074 -0.023 0.000 -0.112 -0.017 0.056 -0.004 0.056 -0.006
[0.008]***[0.038]*** [0.046] [0.027]*** [0.018] [0.000] [0.043]*** [0.010] [0.033]* [0.022] [0.029]* [0.003]**
Employed 0.097 0.236 0.183 0.142 -0.021 -0.000 -0.073 0.016 0.068 -0.097 -0.089 0.030
[0.011]***[0.050]***[0.052]***[0.033]*** [0.027] [0.000] [0.061] [0.015] [0.041]* [0.044]** [0.049]* [0.014]**
Self_employed 0.050 0.053 0.216 0.136 -0.007 0.046 -0.016 0.152 0.054 -0.088 0.008
[0.012]*** [0.066] [0.051]***[0.034]*** [0.025] [0.081] [0.007]** [0.040]*** [0.034] [0.050]* [0.006]
Agriculture -0.007 0.131 0.118 0.030 0.016 0.000 0.032 -0.004 0.002
[0.077] [0.054]** [0.029]*** [0.019] [0.073] [0.035] [0.029] [0.052] [0.004]
Married 0.049 0.104 0.068 0.063 -0.022 0.003 -0.029 -0.016 0.048 0.024 0.099 0.001
[0.008]*** [0.050]** [0.039]* [0.028]** [0.018] [0.003] [0.034] [0.008]** [0.026]* [0.019] [0.025]*** [0.002]
HH_head 0.013 -0.048 0.090 0.003 -0.025 0.000 -0.016 -0.009 -0.011 0.002 0.071 -0.013
[0.007]* [0.047] [0.047]* [0.034] [0.020] [0.000] [0.040] [0.013] [0.027] [0.019] [0.028]** [0.005]**
Earner 0.081 -0.068 -0.331 0.099 0.005
[0.049] [0.037]* [0.152]** [0.028]*** [0.003]
Decision_taker 0.108 -0.034 -0.007 -0.018 -0.002
[0.030]*** [0.021] [0.037] [0.029] [0.019]
Riskaverse 0.044 -0.000 0.020 -0.010 -0.003
[0.040] [0.000] [0.015] [0.031] [0.002]
Numeracy 0.072 -0.004 0.063 0.000 -0.014 0.053 -0.017 -0.089 -0.002





















regional f.e.  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 43044 974 4377 6589 4712 228 1894 3345 3097 5864 1587 2824
pseudo-r2 0.36 0.29 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.3 0.05 0.19 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.23
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Uganda06: household income; Kenya09: expenses; pooled regresions log-income (USD)    43     
 
 
   
Table 11. Excluded from Financial Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ALL Botswana Kenya06 Kenya09 Malawi Namibia Rwanda SouthAfrica Tanzania06 Tanzania09 Uganda Zambia
Female -0.073 -0.129 -0.106 -0.087 0.013 0.015 0.072 0.056 -0.117 -0.075 -0.084 0.000
[0.019]*** [0.040]***[0.037]***[0.023]*** [0.024] [0.040] [0.042]* [0.033]* [0.030]*** [0.023]*** [0.038]** [0.009]
Rural 0.009 -0.069 0.047 0.024 -0.158 0.033 0.025 -0.004 -0.048 0.074 -0.000 -0.012
[0.021] [0.078] [0.031] [0.025] [0.028]*** [0.050] [0.045] [0.024] [0.040] [0.030]** [0.048] [0.010]
Primary -0.137 -0.238 -0.037 -0.064 0.033 -0.112 -0.081 -0.139 0.015 -0.118 -0.079 -0.027
[0.024]*** [0.052]*** [0.035] [0.022]*** [0.022] [0.068]* [0.036]** [0.042]*** [0.042] [0.025]*** [0.037]** [0.014]*
Secondary -0.338 -0.295 -0.076 -0.124 -0.136 -0.251 -0.217 -0.183 -0.083 -0.250 -0.326 -0.190
[0.025]*** [0.061]*** [0.041]* [0.028]***[0.036]***[0.071]***[0.071]*** [0.040]*** [0.044]* [0.044]*** [0.061]***[0.034]***
Tertiary -0.505 -0.399 -0.306 -0.182 -0.467 -0.481 -0.138 -0.587 -0.481 -0.351 -0.705
[0.020]*** [0.038]***[0.018]***[0.039]***[0.041]*** [0.044]*** [0.019]*** [0.055]*** [0.069]*** [0.133]***[0.117]***
Age -0.259 -0.283 -0.043 -0.093 -0.072 -0.130 0.015 -0.195 0.001 -0.011 0.017 -0.049
[0.028]*** [0.079]*** [0.041] [0.027]***[0.028]*** [0.069]* [0.050] [0.055]*** [0.036] [0.031] [0.051] [0.014]***
Income -0.052 -0.087 -0.026 -0.044 -0.060 -0.016 -0.084 -0.025 -0.053 -0.009
[0.009]*** [0.012]***[0.004]***[0.009]***[0.018]*** [0.005]*** [0.013]*** [0.005]*** [0.012]***[0.001]***
Employed -0.405 -0.190 -0.208 -0.099 -0.108 -0.380 -0.055 -0.141 -0.096 -0.231 0.094 -0.149
[0.018]*** [0.053]***[0.039]***[0.024]***[0.037]***[0.049]*** [0.086] [0.037]*** [0.044]** [0.059]*** [0.075] [0.032]***
Self_employed -0.202 -0.007 -0.218 -0.080 -0.013 -0.209 -0.254 -0.015 -0.108 -0.041 0.117 -0.023
[0.024]*** [0.072] [0.036]***[0.027]*** [0.033] [0.058]***[0.078]*** [0.056] [0.043]** [0.039] [0.066]* [0.016]
Agriculture 0.201 -0.139 -0.084 -0.045 -0.003 -0.026 0.056 0.047 0.074 0.005
[0.096]** [0.039]***[0.021]*** [0.025]* [0.095] [0.087] [0.037] [0.036] [0.065] [0.012]
Owns_mobile -0.290 -0.190 -0.162 -0.171 -0.168 -0.303 -0.100 -0.052 -0.118 -0.221 -0.311 -0.063
[0.020]*** [0.042]***[0.036]***[0.025]***[0.022]***[0.046]*** [0.070] [0.039] [0.036]*** [0.027]*** [0.039]***[0.020]***
Married -0.154 -0.178 -0.129 -0.040 0.042 -0.145 -0.095 0.042 -0.057 -0.069 -0.097 -0.021
[0.019]*** [0.053]***[0.034]*** [0.023]* [0.024]* [0.052]*** [0.039]** [0.039] [0.030]* [0.024]*** [0.034]*** [0.009]**
HH_head -0.061 -0.018 -0.083 -0.004 0.045 -0.046 -0.034 0.007 0.021 -0.016 -0.111 0.012
[0.021]*** [0.059] [0.041]** [0.027] [0.027]* [0.050] [0.045] [0.039] [0.031] [0.025] [0.039]*** [0.016]
Earner -0.081 0.037 -0.026 0.606 -0.099 -0.008
[0.056] [0.042] [0.046] [0.071]*** [0.041]** [0.016]
Decision_taker -0.080 -0.009 -0.007 -0.019 0.015
[0.028]*** [0.027] [0.047] [0.033] [0.023]
Riskaverse 0.027 -0.029 -0.061 0.002 0.016
[0.046] [0.043] [0.024]** [0.040] [0.009]*
Numeracy -0.140 -0.054 -0.211 -0.166 -0.029 -0.098 -0.021 -0.048 -0.016





















regional f.e.  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 43044 974 4377 6589 4712 1065 1894 3345 3097 5864 1587 3152
pseudor2 0.39 0.35 0.2 0.25 0.11 0.48 0.11 0.31 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.5
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Uganda06: household income; Kenya09: expenses; pooled regresions log-income (USD)    44     
 
Table 12. Economic Effect of Gender Gaps in the Use of Formal Finance 
ALL Botswana Kenya06 Kenya09 Malawi Namibia





Rural 0.01 -1.60* 0.0000 -0.01 0.28 -0.0013 0.04 -2.61*** -0.0052 0.01 -1.07 -0.0008 0.01 -0.55 -0.0003 0.01 -0.37 -0.0005
Primary -0.03 6.10*** -0.0055 0.07 -2.58*** 0.0178 -0.06 4.24*** -0.0012 0.00 -0.03 0.0001 0.00 0.12 0.0000 0.02 -0.67 0.0018
Secondary -0.05 13.96*** -0.0236 -0.01 0.45 -0.0044 -0.08 6.19*** -0.0261 -0.08 7.71*** -0.0273 -0.05 4.89*** -0.0067 -0.05 1.76** -0.0115
Tertiary -0.01 7.78*** -0.0077 -0.04 3.05*** -0.0213 -0.02 5.09*** -0.0163 -0.02 4.64*** -0.0092 0.00 0.2 -0.0005 -0.01 0.68
Age -0.05 13.33*** -0.0132 0.01 -0.32 0.0014 -0.05 4.28*** -0.0120 -0.06 5.59*** -0.0118 -0.07 5.91*** -0.0034 0.02 -0.99 0.0022
Income -0.53  13.44***   -0.32 1.50* -0.0248 -0.2 7.45*** -0.0294 -0.39 4.81*** -0.0142 -0.69 3.07*** -0.0316
Employed -0.08 20.93*** -0.0311 -0.12 4.43*** -0.0141 -0.12 9.19*** -0.0219 -0.12 11.94***-0.0160 -0.04 3.95*** -0.0053 -0.09 3.37*** -0.0354
Self_employed 0.00 -0.14 0.0001 0.04 -2.12** -0.0006 0.02 -1.71** 0.0025 0.01 -0.53 0.0004 0.00 -0.34 0.0000 0.01 -0.83 0.0028
Agriculture -0.02 4.07*** -0.02 1.17 0.0032 -0.02 1.38* -0.0037 -0.03 2.29** -0.0018 -0.01 0.54 -0.0004 -0.01 1.19 0.0004
Owns_mobile -0.06 13.69*** -0.0197 0.04 -1.27 0.0070 -0.1 7.07*** -0.0293 -0.12 9.93*** -0.0365 -0.03 2.47*** -0.0060 -0.07 2.63*** -0.0225
HH_head -0.4 90.59*** -0.0321 -0.16 5.84*** 0.0021 -0.39 28.76*** 0.0054 -0.48 43.84***-0.0125 -0.55 46.07*** 0.0027 -0.07 2.39*** -0.0027
Married -0.05 10.12*** -0.0047 -0.01 0.4 -0.0012 -0.06 3.73*** -0.0017 -0.06 4.95*** 0.0021 -0.1 8.39*** 0.0019 -0.03 1.21 -0.0045
Decision_tak -0.05 8.54*** -0.04 3.18*** -0.0040 -0.09 7.87*** -0.0024
Earner -0.19 33.36*** -0.12 4.03*** -0.0131 -0.06 9.73*** -0.0009 0.05 -1.95** 0.0014
Riskaverse 0.03 -3.70*** 0.08 -3.47*** -0.0070 -0.02 0.8 -0.0006
Numeracy -0.08 15.71*** -0.07 2.74*** -0.0046 -0.15 12.76***-0.0156 -0.02 2.00** -0.0023 -0.01 0.61 -0.0018
Rwanda SouthAfrica Tanzania06 Tanzania09 Uganda Zambia





Rural 0.00 -0.07 0.0000 0.00 -0.31 -0.0003 0.04 -2.96*** -0.0010 -0.08 8.21*** 0.0002 -0.07 4.16*** 0.0003 0.00 -0.17 0.0000
Primary -0.05 2.22** -0.0058 0.03 -1.62* 0.0053 -0.06 4.38*** -0.0027 -0.06 5.07*** -0.0014 -0.04 1.91** -0.0033 0.00 0.29 0.0000
Secondary -0.02 2.13** -0.0101 -0.04 2.57*** -0.0124 -0.03 2.59*** -0.0034 -0.02 2.69*** -0.0030 -0.05 3.71*** -0.0144 -0.08 5.47*** -0.0089
Tertiary -0.01 2.14** -0.0097 0.00 0.05 -0.0001 -0.01 2.41*** -0.0048 -0.01 4.12*** -0.0053 -0.01 2.54*** -0.0054 -0.01 3.71*** -0.0073
Age -0.03 1.55* -0.0021 0.01 -0.42 0.0014 -0.08 6.85*** -0.0019 -0.09 10.28***-0.0039 -0.03 2.00** 0.0005 -0.1 8.39*** -0.0021
Income -0.46 6.24*** -0.0153 -0.23 1.92** -0.0059 -1.43 12.44*** -0.0445 -0.66 9.27*** -0.0066 -0.25 3.58*** -0.0091 -1.93 8.73*** -0.0077
Employed -0.06 4.72*** -0.0081 -0.11 7.18*** -0.0169 -0.07 7.51*** -0.0018 -0.02 4.88*** -0.0021 -0.05 4.02*** -0.0005 -0.07 5.81*** -0.0038
Self_employed -0.02 1.31* -0.0037 -0.02 2.30** -0.0008 -0.03 2.70*** 0.0003 -0.02 2.23** 0.0003 0.03 -1.93** -0.0016 0.03 -2.25** 0.0002
Agriculture 0.07 -3.50*** 0.0028 -0.05 4.10*** 0.0011 -0.05 4.74*** 0.0024 -0.03 1.49* 0.0025 -0.08 6.06*** -0.0001
Owns_mobile 0 0.2 -0.0002 0.03 -2.43*** 0.0038 -0.08 7.58*** -0.0035 -0.08 7.72*** -0.0095 -0.07 4.42*** -0.0213 -0.04 2.80*** -0.0009
HH_head -0.44 20.80*** -0.0022 -0.28 18.56*** 0.0077 -0.21 15.78*** 0.0008 -0.49 48.90***-0.0010 -0.48 29.88*** -0.0201 -0.42 29.71*** 0.0000
Married -0.13 5.73*** -0.0028 -0.09 5.62*** 0.0028 -0.1 7.41*** -0.0005 0.03 -2.86*** 0.0003 -0.03 1.65** 0.0002 -0.04 2.48*** -0.0001
Decision_taker 0.01 -0.37 0.0004 -0.04 3.39*** -0.0005 -0.04 3.55*** 0.0001
Earner -0.11 7.77*** 0.0975 -0.07 9.62*** 0.0015 -0.4 27.72*** 0.0004
Riskaverse 0.04 -3.17*** 0.0007 0.00 0.05 0.0000 0.03 -2.55*** -0.0001
Numeracy -0.06 3.06*** -0.0019 -0.13 9.41*** -0.0023 -0.12 11.29***-0.0024 -0.07 5.57*** -0.0089 -0.07 5.65*** -0.0004
note: bold if beta siginificant at 10% (table 9)    45     
 
 
   
Table A1. Sample for Enterprise Analysis
country obs country obs
Albania2007 294 Kyrgyz Republic2009 230
Albania2009 172 Lao PDR2009 360
Angola2006 423 Latvia2009 256
Argentina2006 1,025 Lithuania2009 269
Armenia2009 371 Macedonia, FYR2009 360
Azerbaijan2009 374 Mali2007 610
Belarus2008 262 Mauritania2006 237
Bhutan2009 250 Mexico2006 1,415
Bolivia2006 598 Moldova2009 356
Botswana2006 342 Mongolia2009 360
Brazil2009 1,185 Mozambique2007 479
Bulgaria2007 1,002 Namibia2006 322
Bulgaria2009 282 Nepal2009 368
Burkina Faso2006 133 Nicaragua2006 469
Burundi2006 268 Nigeria2007 2,309
Cameroon2006 153 Panama2006 581
Cape Verde2006 96 Paraguay2006 597
Chile2006 994 Peru2006 625
Colombia2006 993 Poland2009 422
Congo, Dem. Rep.2006 339 Romania2009 501
Croatia2007 615 Russian Federation2009 969
Croatia2009 157 Rwanda2006 209
Czech Republic2009 238 Senegal2007 505
Ecuador2006 647 Serbia2009 381
El Salvador2006 676 Slovak Republic2009 258
Estonia2009 254 Slovenia2009 270
Gambia, The2006 174 SouthAfrica2007 925
Georgia2008 363 Swaziland2006 305
Ghana2007 494 Tajikistan2008 351
Guatemala2006 511 Tanzania2006 413
Guinea-Bissau2006 159 Turkey2008 1,134
Honduras2006 430 Uganda2006 563
Hungary2009 281 Ukraine2008 806
Kazakhstan2009 533 Uruguay2006 582
Kenya2007 654 Zambia2007 596
Total 35,135    46     
 
 
Table A2. Summary Statistics Household Surveys by Country
Bostwana 2004 Kenya 2006 Kenya 2009 Malawi 2008 Namibia 2004 Rwanda 2008
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Banking 1200 0.43 0.50 0 1 4418 0.19 0.39 0 1 6598 0.25 0.44 0 1 4993 0.19 0.39 0 1 1200 0.53 0.50 0 1 2000 0.14 0.35 0 1
Informal 1200 0.31 0.46 0 1 4418 0.50 0.50 0 1 6598 0.50 0.50 0 1 4993 0.25 0.43 0 1 1200 0.01 0.08 0 1 2000 0.26 0.44 0 1
Excluded 1200 0.46 0.50 0 1 4418 0.39 0.49 0 1 6598 0.36 0.48 0 1 4993 0.55 0.50 0 1 1200 0.46 0.50 0 1 2000 0.53 0.50 0 1
Transactions 1200 0.58 0.49 0 1 4418 0.32 0.47 0 1 6598 0.49 0.50 0 1 4993 0.40 0.49 0 1 1200 0.58 0.49 0 1 2000 0.21 0.40 0 1
Savings 1200 0.51 0.50 0 1 4418 0.39 0.49 0 1 6598 0.53 0.50 0 1 4993 0.36 0.48 0 1 1200 0.52 0.50 0 1 2000 0.38 0.49 0 1
Credit 1200 0.20 0.40 0 1 4418 0.22 0.41 0 1 6598 0.22 0.41 0 1 4993 0.19 0.39 0 1 1200 0.10 0.30 0 1 2000 0.24 0.43 0 1
Insurance 1200 0.29 0.45 0 1 4418 0.07 0.25 0 1 6598 0.09 0.29 0 1 4993 0.05 0.22 0 1 1200 0.18 0.38 0 1 2000 0.81 0.39 0 1
Female 1200 0.51 0.50 0 1 4418 0.56 0.50 0 1 6598 0.59 0.49 0 1 4993 0.52 0.50 0 1 1200 0.50 0.50 0 1 2000 0.64 0.48 0 1
Married 1197 0.21 0.40 0 1 4418 0.61 0.49 0 1 6598 0.60 0.49 0 1 4993 0.74 0.44 0 1 1200 0.25 0.43 0 1 2000 0.55 0.50 0 1
HH_head 1199 0.41 0.49 0 1 4418 0.38 0.48 0 1 6598 0.49 0.50 0 1 4993 0.50 0.50 0 1 1200 0.38 0.48 0 1 2000 0.51 0.50 0 1
No-education 1200 0.27 0.44 0 1 4402 0.43 0.50 0 1 6598 0.43 0.50 0 1 4993 0.18 0.39 0 1 1200 0.14 0.34 0 1 2000 0.42 0.49 0 1
Primary 1200 0.36 0.48 0 1 4402 0.36 0.48 0 1 6598 0.32 0.46 0 1 4993 0.55 0.50 0 1 1200 0.44 0.50 0 1 2000 0.50 0.50 0 1
Secondary 1200 0.32 0.47 0 1 4402 0.23 0.42 0 1 6598 0.23 0.42 0 1 4993 0.13 0.34 0 1 1200 0.40 0.49 0 1 2000 0.06 0.24 0 1
Tertiary 1200 0.06 0.23 0 1 4402 0.02 0.15 0 1 6598 0.02 0.14 0 1 4993 0.02 0.15 0 1 1200 0.03 0.16 0 1 2000 0.01 0.12 0 1
Numeracy 1200 0.34 0.48 0 1 0 6598 0.40 0.49 0 1 4993 0.09 0.29 0 1 1200 0.20 0.40 0 1 2000 0.78 0.41 0 1
Owns_mobile 1200 0.38 0.48 0 1 4393 0.27 0.45 0 1 6598 0.47 0.50 0 1 4993 0.33 0.47 0 1 1200 0.37 0.48 0 1 2000 0.07 0.25 0 1
Age_log 1200 3.48 0.39 2.89 4.47 4418 3.51 0.41 2.77 4.50 6597 3.57 0.42 2.77 4.65 4993 3.51 0.40 2.89 4.58 1198 3.45 0.37 2.77 4.48 2000 3.55 0.40 2.89 4.51
Employed 1200 0.37 0.48 0 1 4418 0.24 0.43 0 1 6598 0.22 0.42 0 1 4993 0.15 0.36 0 1 1200 0.40 0.49 0 1 2000 0.10 0.30 0 1
Self_emplo~d 1200 0.10 0.29 0 1 4418 0.20 0.40 0 1 6598 0.20 0.40 0 1 4993 0.15 0.35 0 1 1200 0.11 0.31 0 1 2000 0.11 0.31 0 1
Agriculture 1200 0.06 0.23 0 1 4418 0.35 0.48 0 1 6598 0.34 0.47 0 1 4993 0.46 0.50 0 1 1200 0.05 0.21 0 1 2000 0.72 0.45 0 1
Riskaverse 1200 0.21 0.41 0 1 0 0 0 1200 0.35 0.48 0 1 0
Rural 1200 0.67 0.47 0 1 4418 0.68 0.47 0 1 6598 0.71 0.45 0 1 4993 0.81 0.39 0 1 1200 0.55 0.50 0 1 2000 0.75 0.44 0 1
Earner 1154 0.40 0.49 0 1 0 0 4968 0.95 0.23 0 1 1200 0.24 0.43 0 1 2000 0.36 0.48 0 1
Decision_mkr 0 0 6598 0.73 0.44 0 1 4993 0.80 0.40 0 1 0 2000 0.77 0.42 0 1
log_income 1023 4.70 3.44 -0.69 10.13 0 0 4737 7.85 2.82 -0.69 14.22 1091 4.63 3.71 -0.69 10.82 1894 8.60 1.57 -0.69 14.91
log_incomehh 737 6.86 2.31 -0.69 11.00 0 0 0 816 6.84 2.98 -0.69 12.21 0
log_expenses 0 0 6590 8.90 1.09 3.00 13.61 0 0 0
region 1200 3.41 1.08 1 4 4418 5 2 1 8 6598 4.30 2.12 1 8 4993 2.31 0.76 1 3 1200 7.27 3.56 1 13 2000 3.31 1.38 1 5
weight 1200 1.00 0.33 0.56 5.09 4418 4127 2778 33.294 25576 6598 1.00 0.80 0.03 9.02 4993 1212.33 726.71 197.68 3844.6 0 2000 1846.9 1235.7 100.7 9377.4    47     
 
 
SouthAfrica 2008 Tanzania 2006 Tanzania 2009 Uganda 2006 Zambia 2005 All 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max n. obs. mean st.dev. min max
Banking 3900 0.70 0.46 0 1 4962 0.10 0.31 0 1 7680 0.11 0.32 0 1 2959 0.16 0.37 0 1 3998 0.14 0.35 0 1 43908 0.23 0.42 0 1
Informal 3900 0.08 0.28 0 1 4962 0.24 0.43 0 1 7680 0.27 0.44 0 1 2959 0.21 0.41 0 1 3998 0.03 0.17 0 1 43908 0.27 0.45 0 1
Excluded 3900 0.19 0.39 0 1 4962 0.66 0.47 0 1 7680 0.57 0.49 0 1 2959 0.62 0.48 0 1 3998 0.83 0.38 0 1 43908 0.57 0.49 0 1
Transactions 3900 0.75 0.43 0 1 4962 0.26 0.44 0 1 7680 0.15 0.36 0 1 2959 0.39 0.49 0 1 3998 0.26 0.44 0 1 43908 0.36 0.48 0 1
Savings 3900 0.41 0.49 0 1 4962 0.54 0.50 0 1 7680 0.68 0.46 0 1 2959 0.72 0.45 0 1 3998 0.23 0.42 0 1 43908 0.49 0.50 0 1
Credit 3900 0.32 0.47 0 1 4962 0.20 0.40 0 1 7680 0.17 0.37 0 1 2959 0.29 0.45 0 1 3998 0.05 0.21 0 1 43908 0.20 0.40 0 1
Insurance 3900 0.52 0.50 0 1 4962 0.06 0.24 0 1 7680 0.06 0.24 0 1 0 3998 0.06 0.25 0 1 40949 0.16 0.36 0 1
Female 3900 0.50 0.50 0 1 4962 0.47 0.50 0 1 7680 0.53 0.50 0 1 2959 0.52 0.50 0 1 3998 0.50 0.50 0 1 43908 0.53 0.50 0 1
Married 3900 0.38 0.49 0 1 4962 0.59 0.49 0 1 7680 0.73 0.44 0 1 2959 0.55 0.50 0 1 3998 0.51 0.50 0 1 43905 0.59 0.49 0 1
HH_head 3900 0.48 0.50 0 1 4962 0.34 0.47 0 1 7672 0.54 0.50 0 1 2957 0.55 0.50 0 1 3998 0.42 0.49 0 1 43897 0.46 0.50 0 1
No-education 3900 0.06 0.24 0 1 4798 0.23 0.42 0 1 7666 0.27 0.44 0 1 2485 0.44 0.50 0 1 3998 0.26 0.44 0 1 43240 0.29 0.45 0 1
Primary 3900 0.46 0.50 0 1 4798 0.51 0.50 0 1 7666 0.64 0.48 0 1 2485 0.43 0.50 0 1 3998 0.47 0.50 0 1 43240 0.47 0.50 0 1
Secondary 3900 0.37 0.48 0 1 4798 0.25 0.44 0 1 7666 0.09 0.28 0 1 2485 0.11 0.31 0 1 3998 0.26 0.44 0 1 43240 0.20 0.40 0 1
Tertiary 3900 0.11 0.31 0 1 4798 0.01 0.11 0 1 7666 0.01 0.08 0 1 2485 0.02 0.13 0 1 3998 0.01 0.11 0 1 43240 0.03 0.16 0 1
Numeracy 0 4962 0.50 0.50 0 1 7680 0.69 0.46 0 1 2959 0.16 0.36 0 1 3998 0.22 0.41 0 1 35590 0.41 0.49 0 1
Owns_mobile 3900 0.73 0.44 0 1 4962 0.19 0.39 0 1 7680 0.26 0.44 0 1 2959 0.28 0.45 0 1 3998 0.20 0.40 0 1 43883 0.33 0.47 0 1
Age_log 3900 3.56 0.41 2.77 4.60 4959 3.48 0.41 2.77 4.60 7680 3.52 0.38 2.77 4.60 2801 3.49 0.37 2.89 4.55 3990 3.34 0.37 3 4 43736 3.51 0.40 2.77 4.65
Employed 3900 0.37 0.48 0 1 4962 0.14 0.34 0 1 7680 0.04 0.20 0 1 2959 0.15 0.35 0 1 3998 0.19 0.40 0 1 43908 0.18 0.39 0 1
Self_emplo~d 3900 0.07 0.26 0 1 4962 0.20 0.40 0 1 7680 0.18 0.38 0 1 2959 0.28 0.45 0 1 3998 0.17 0.38 0 1 43908 0.17 0.38 0 1
Agriculture 0 4962 0.28 0.45 0 1 7680 0.60 0.49 0 1 2959 0.46 0.50 0 1 3998 0.26 0.44 0 1 40008 0.40 0.49 0 1
Riskaverse 3900 0.24 0.43 0 1 0 0 2959 0.21 0.41 0 1 3998 0.25 0.43 0 1 13257 0.24 0.43 0 1
Rural 3900 0.24 0.43 0 1 4962 0.45 0.50 0 1 7680 0.77 0.42 0 1 2959 0.71 0.45 0 1 3998 0.68 0.47 0 1 43908 0.65 0.48 0 1
Earner 0 4962 0.62 0.48 0 1 7680 0.89 0.31 0 1 0 3998 0.45 0.50 0 1 25962 0.69 0.46 0 1
Decision_mkr 0 4588 0.78 0.41 0 1 7680 0.69 0.46 0 1 0 0 25859 0.74 0.44 0 1
log_income 3345 5.80 3.42 -0.69 11.04 3427 9.08 3.43 -0.69 12.43 5886 9.94 2.76 -0.69 14.22 0 3158 8.67 6.27 -1 16
log_incomehh 3307 7.14 2.42 -0.69 11.04 2604 10.10 2.58 -0.69 12.43 5230 11.13 1.14 -0.69 14.22 1956 10.10 1.56 5.12 19.62 2292 12.07 3.97 -1 16 31151 2.93 3.47 -9.10 9.37
log_expenses 0 0 0 0 0
region 3900 4.88 2.54 1 9 4962 23.3 20.5 1 55 7680 13.8 12.8 1 55 2959 3.3 1.3 1 5 3998 5 3 1 9 43908 8.0 11.1 1 55














Sample size: 79 countries
Banking Informal Excluded
country Gap tstat Gap tstat Gap tstat
Bostwana -2 0.89 4 -1.31 -4 1.33
Kenya06 -9 7.73 10 -6.55 0.00 0.38
Kenya09 -11 10.99 13 -10.7 -2 1.17
Malawi -3 2.21 -1 0.89 4 -2.84
Namibia -7 2.48 -1 2.11 7 -2.48
Rwanda -5 2.6 -4 1.76 8 -3.77
SouthAfrica -4 3.06 3 -3.02 -1 0.4
Tanzania06 -8 9.3 5 -4.65 3 -2.03
Tanzania09 -4 5.3 3 -3.09 1 -1.06
Uganda -10 7.33 1 -0.16 8 -4.05
Zambia -6 5.37 0 -1.24 6 -4.83

































60 Panel B: Informal
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Figure 2. Gender Gap in the Use of Finacial Services